holding protesters had turned out in front of Carrefour stores in a number of cities, including Qingdao, Changsha, Hefei, Wuhan, and Kunming. In Hefei-where picketers briefly occupied the checkout counters and blocked the entrance to the store by holding up a long banner that read 'Tibet Will Forever Be an Inseparable Part of China' (Zhang & Chen 2008)-and Wuhan, the stores were briefly forced to close. In Kunming, where the picket was organized by four young people in their early twenties but was soon joined by secondary and even primary school students, a few people turned out with placards to oppose the calls for the boycott, arguing that it was hurting Chinese employees and discouraging foreign investment. The picketers denounced them as 'traitors'; someone threw a bottle at them, and an old man threatened to post their photos on the Internet (Tang & Chen 2008) . Shoppers coming out of Carrefour stores were heckled as well. After a few days, the boycott appeared to be having some effect, as newspapers reported that Carrefour began returning unsold stock to suppliers (who were contractually obliged to take it back). It made little difference that shop assistants at Carrefour decked themselves out in 'support-the-Olympics caps' and pinned Chinese flags on their chests (Sina.com.cn 2008) . In fact, when Jin Jing said in an interview that those who call for a boycott should be careful because it would hurt Chinese employees, sections of Internet opinion immediately turned against her-she was denounced as a traitor paid off by the French and an 'uncultured brainless cunt': 'She better disappear immediately, or she will die with her body in more than one piece'; 'The interest of a number of Chinese employees cannot be as important as the interests of a nation'; 'Even if we starve to death, we must ruin Carrefour.' 1 In the end, both 'Kitty Shelley' and the four organizers of the Kunming picket began feeling uneasy about the crowds, which now included seven-year-olds singing the national anthem, highschool girls collecting donations 'for the boycott,' and protesters with corporate T-shirts. But by this time, Kitty Shelley herself was being called a traitor by some on the Internet.
From blogs and bulletin boards, the boycott movement spread to the main portals. The
Ministry of Commerce clearly began worrying about the fallout of the boycott among foreign investors, and started urging citizens to express their patriotism 'rationally,' reminding them that Carrefour had nearly 40,000 Chinese employees and sold almost exclusively Chinese goods. The newspapers picked up the cue (see Zhao 2008: 54) , but, 1 Comments from the www.163.com (Netease) forum, translated by Roland Soong (EastSouthWestNorth 2008) .
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despite the blocking of access to some sites with posts calling for the boycott and featuring videos of pickets, the Internet resisted. Sina.com.cn, one of the largest Chinese portals, organized a debate with the title 'Patriotism: rational or passionate?' (Aiguo:
lixing haishi xuexing 2 ), with Lin Chengpeng representing the latter, and well-known Peking University sociologist Zheng Yefu the former viewpoint. 3 The debate, conducted before a screen with a giant red heart, was introduced by a video that showed footage of protests outside and inside China, accompanied by this voiceover: 'In the face of the Dalai clique's conspiracy to split the Fatherland, in the face of Tibetan separatists' efforts to ruin the Olympics, the Chinese people's patriotic fervour erupted like a tsunami.' Readers were invited to vote on which of the two views they agreed with:
'Some patriotic actions may be extreme, but they are manifestations of national rectitude (minzu xuexing); as members of the Chinese race, we can only support them, not ignore them' (Lin's view); or 'Patriotism cannot be "hurt a thousand people, lose eight hundred of your own"; excessive patriotism may be laudable as an emotion (qing ke jia) but is not rational enough' (Zheng's view). Although, or perhaps because, Zheng's phrasing was more confused and self-contradictory than adversarial-indeed, it was so poorly phrased for a prominent scholar as to suggest he was afraid of challenging what seemed the popular view-he received only 13 percent of 4,334 votes, while 60 percent supported Li Chengpeng. On the other hand, the votes split about evenly (37 percent vs 36 percent) between those who agreed that the best way of expressing patriotism was to boycott foreign goods and those who said the best way to do so was to 'do one's own job well,' with only 11 percent choosing the answer that 'demonstrations by our overseas sons' were the best way. 4 In another poll, on the (Watts 2007) Rui knew how to present his campaign to Western media. He couched it in terms that were quite similar to the anti-globalisation consumer politics of North America and
Western Europe: 'We need to embrace the world, but we also need to preserve our cultural identity. There is a fine line between globalisation and contamination' (Watts 2007) . For those used to the strident tone that nationalists debates on the Chinese Web tend to take, the response that followed from his online readers came as no surprise. 11 When 11 Despite heavy moderator presence-which is mandated to filter out 'harmful' content-flaming seems to be accepted on most Chinese blogs and bulletin boards, and often extends to death threats. Online violence, sometimes leading to offline attacks, has been documented in a number of instances, often but not always linked to nationalistic causes. For example, in 2006, when China offered aid to tsunami-struck Indonesia, a number of posters on Internet forums who opposed the move because of Indonesia's treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, issued calls to 'kill Indo pigs' or 'send troops to Indonesia.' One participant in the discussion on Tianya wrote: 'I want to be a suicide bomber and go to the Indonesian embassy.' In another infamous case the same year, a man denounced a college student he suspected of having an affair with his wife on Tianya. In response, readers teamed up to uncover and then post the student's address and telephone number, then showed up at his university and his parents' home, forcing him to drop out of school. Others denounced the university for not expelling him, with one poster saying it should be 'bombed by Iranian missiles.' Many others said the student should be beheaded, beaten, or have his hands chopped off, or that he and his alleged lover should be drowned. See French (2006) . The Xinhua News Agency reported that the ads were 'seen as degrading to the national motor industry and injurious to the national sentiments of the broad masses of viewers' (Xinhua 2004) . Toyota, the advertising company and the magazine that published the ads all apologized. In its response to readers, the magazine, Guoji Guanggao, stated:
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'because our political level is not high, we were unable to identify the pictures that could easily provoke associations that hurt national feelings … We recognize the gravity of the issue' (Xinhua 2004) . Even so, a number of counter-ads fabricated by protesters continued to circulate on the Internet. In one ( by the ad. 14 The same moral outrage enveloped print media, television and radio, each hastening to add its criticism. As one journalist commented, it was 'as if whoever has fallen behind is unpatriotic' (Li Yanjun 2006). The effect, again, was a bit like a struggle session: if you were not wholehearted in your criticism, you could be the next to be struggled against.
From nationalism to the politics of taste?
Consumer boycotts in China appear to fit more into the pattern described by Karl Gerth in his work on the politics of 'national products' (guohuo) in Republican China than into the kind of fair-trade, ethical, ecological, local-food, slow-food, or antiglobalization politics that characterize Western consumer movements. 15 Gerth argues that the 'national products' movement-manifested in the first place in boycotts of Japanese goods-projected onto commodities aspirations of national unity and of living 'modern' commodity-filled lifestyles without surrendering to foreign imperialism. The movement and its 'nationalistic spectacles,' he writes, 'began to create an environment in which patriotic (or anti-patriotic) practice became inescapable' (Gerth 2003: 207 When we extend the topic of preserving traditional culture too far beyond the topic, people tend to get lost in recollections and fear about the wounds of history, or else get mired in self-satisfaction about history. At that point, even if Starbucks moves out, 'Zhang-bucks' or 'Li-bucks' will move in. Influenced by such discussions, it is often hard, because of the emotions of the crowds, for officials in charge of cultural preservation to focus on the real goals of conservation.… If we simply see Starbucks moving into the Forbidden City as 'foreign peddlers usurping the dignity of the heavenly dynasty,' that is disrespecting both traditional Chinese culture and the rules of global business. Besides, we can hardly avoid discussing the fact that those who allowed Starbucks to move into the Forbidden City in the first place were, sadly, Chinese people themselves. ( The debate then drifted off in a dietetic direction: was Western junk food bad for you?
Because of the traditional importance attributed to food in Chinese thinking about health, child nutrition has become a battleground contested by parents and grandparents with traditional beliefs, consumer goods companies targeting a generation of single and therefore supposedly spoiled children, and medical professionals with a Westerninspired view on health (see Jing 2000) . In this particular debate, Happyer-1 angrily rejected KFC's latest efforts to recast itself as a nutrition expert, 'as if Chinese people had no idea about nutrition;' but other posters wrote that, on the contrary, Chinese people's lack of health education was responsible for KFC's popularity. One, Lishui
Qingyun, laid the blame for that at the feet of the Chinese government, pointing out that 'abroad, KFC is banned from school cafeteria' and saying that instead of cracking down 
It's hard to be highbrow
Shortly after the Starbucks affair, two US-based business academics with previous experience in corporate communications in China advised multinational companies to 'encourage and even promote "confident nationalism" in the Chinese society' as a way to limit damage from nationalistic consumer actions (Wang & Wang 2007 Chinese consumers in the near future, but they do mark a departure from a nearly exclusive preoccupation with nationalism (and safety) and a shift towards concern with class. That such globalized means of distinguishing oneself from less modern or classy people as refusing to eat American fast food has finally reached the Chinese consuming class is of course by no means surprising. The question that must be asked is, rather, why the explicit articulation of highbrow eating has taken so long to appear.
For a country with such a strong cultural nationalist discourse as China's, it is remarkable that the kind of opposition to U.S. 'cultural imperialism,' strongly tinged The recent proliferation of consumer boycotts, then, is part and parcel of the wave of popular nationalism that China is experiencing. As such, it is subject to the complex symbiosis between market and state in which the official discourse of the nation is coopted in commercial advertising and percolates down to Internet bulletin boards, while at the same time nationalist mobilization is subject to strict limits. Yet, though there is ample evidence for state manipulation and control of consumer nationalism, the boycotts discussed in this article have been grassroots movements. Although they reflect the prevailing mood of nationalism, they have nonetheless allowed the diversity of opinions normally restricted to online discussions spill briefly out to the streets. The politics of consumption are once again moving to the centre of Chinese nationalism; but they also provide an arena for emerging discourses of taste that allow individuals to sidestep or modify dominant versions of nationalism.
